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INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the 2016 presidential election, public intimidation of wom-
en, particularly women of color, seems to be on the rise.1 Even before the elec-
tion, however, a woman’s presence on a public street or public website has rou-
tinely made her a target for unwanted and often threatening male attention, also 
known as street harassment or cyber-harassment. Scholars and journalists have 
called for laws that would penalize street and cyber-harassment.2 However, this 
type of legislative effort will be met with several difficulties, including logisti-
cal problems due to the high prevalence and anonymity of street and cyber-
harassment, as well as cultural opposition to what is perceived by many to be a 
nonexistent or minor issue with little actual consequences.3 Another major ar-
gument against regulation of street and cyber-harassment is that any laws pro-
hibiting such speech would violate the First Amendment. In response to the lat-
ter argument, this Article argues that laws regulating street or cyber-harassment 
should be protected from First Amendment scrutiny under the captive audience 
doctrine. As this Article demonstrates, by using the captive audience doctrine, 
                                                
*  Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville. Many thanks to the participants and 
audience members at the Fifth Annual Symposium on Constitutional Law and the 2016 Law 
and Society Annual Meeting, who provided valuable feedback on earlier drafts of this arti-
cle. 
1  Alexis Okeowo, Hate on the Rise After Trump’s Election, NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 2016), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/hate-on-the-rise-after-trumps-election [https://p 
erma.cc/RG7Z-D9DE]. 
2  See, e.g., Tiffanie Heben, A Radical Reshaping of the Law: Interpreting and Remedying 
Street Harassment, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 183 (1994); Sarah Jameson, Cyber-
harassment: Striking a Balance Between Free Speech and Privacy, 17 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 231, 234 (2008). 
3  Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 517, 519 (1993); Amanda Hess, Why Women Aren’t Welcome on the Internet, 
PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 6, 2014), https://psmag.com/why-women-aren-t-welcome-on-the-inter 
net-aa21fdbc8d6#.2oh6joc1f [https://perma.cc/P6BH-CZW7]. 
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legislators can attack the problem of street and cyber-harassment without run-
ning afoul of the First Amendment. 
I.   EXPLAINING STREET AND CYBER-HARASSMENT 
According to noted feminist scholar Cynthia Grant Bowman, the best 
working definition of street harassment (sometimes referred to as “catcalling”) 
is 
when one or more strange men accost one or more women . . . in a public place 
which is not the woman’s/women’s worksite. Through looks, words, or gestures 
the man asserts his right to intrude on the woman’s attention, defining her as a 
sexual object, and forcing her to interact with him.4  
Street harassment can range from seemingly benign (a quick “hello”) to patent-
ly offensive (lasciviously commenting on a woman’s body or calling her insult-
ing names). Sexual comments can also be combined with racial or ethnic slurs, 
or references to a woman’s perceived homosexuality.5  
Street harassment is a prevalent phenomenon that generally affects women 
of every race, religion, and sexual orientation. Some studies have revealed that 
over 80 percent of women have been subjected to street harassment.6 Although 
men, particularly gay men, are also subjected to street harassment,7 due to the 
prevalence of male harassment of women, this article will be using the corre-
sponding pronouns for ease of writing. The arguments that are made in this Ar-
ticle should apply just as forcefully to male victims who receive similar treat-
ment on account of their gender or sexual orientation.  
A majority of women who experience street harassment have reported that 
they find it intimidating and it negatively affects their daily lives.8 In addition 
to feeling that their privacy is invaded, women have also stated that it makes 
them fearful of rape.9 Research has shown that street harassment causes lower 
                                                
4  Bowman, supra note 3, at 524 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
5  Heben, supra note 2, at 187–88. 
6  Amanda Roenius, Comment, My Name Is Not “Beautiful,” and, No, I Do Not Want to 
Smile: Paving the Path for Street Harassment Legislation in Illinois, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 
831, 842 (2016). 
7  Deirdre Davis, The Harm That Has No Name: Street Harassment, Embodiment, and Afri-
can American Women, 4 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 133, 152 n.96 (1994). 
8  See Natalie DiBlasio, Voices: Catcalls Aren’t Flattering, They’re Frightening, USA 
TODAY (updated Aug. 20, 2014, 9:50 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/20 
14/08/19/catcalling-ny-post/14300189/ [https://perma.cc/9EZP-SLFS]; Katarina Hybenova, 
Catcalling Is NOT Flattering: Why I Stopped Running in Bushwick, BUSHWICK DAILY (Aug. 
20, 2014), http://bushwickdaily.com/bushwick/categories/opinion/2524-cat-calling-is-not-
flattering-why-i-stopped-running-in-bushwick [https://perma.cc/85XU-XZQP]. But see 
Doree Lewak, Hey, Ladies—Catcalls Are Flattering! Deal with It, N.Y. POST (Aug. 18, 
2014, 10:38 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/08/18/enough-sanctimony-ladies-catcalls-are-flat 
tering/ [https://perma.cc/Q4QD-AGXG]. 
9  Deborah M. Thompson, “The Woman in the Street:” Reclaiming the Public Space from 
Sexual Harassment, 6 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 313, 320 (1994); Bowman, supra note 3, at 
535. Their fears are well founded; evidence has shown that rapists often use street harass-
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self-esteem, psychological damage, and even physical distress.10 It also im-
pedes women’s geographic mobility because women will change their routes, 
modes of transportation, or go out less often to avoid street harassment.11 For 
example, 72 percent of American women in one survey stated they took differ-
ent transportation to avoid street harassment.12 In addition, the harms are exac-
erbated for women of color, who have historically been objectified to an even 
greater extent than white women.13 
The reasons men engage in street harassment appear to be wide-ranging. In 
one study, interviews with men have shown that men often engage in “girl 
watching” to build camaraderie with other men and they have no real interest in 
engaging with the woman at all.14 In another study, men have reportedly given 
three broad reasons for engaging in street harassment: to “cheer up” women 
with a compliment, for “fun,” and to humiliate women.15 
The humiliation rationale resonates with feminist scholarship. Many femi-
nists have argued that street harassment is a tool for men to exercise their pow-
er over women and remind women of “their place” when they are in public.16 
When engaging in street harassment, men want the other men they are with, as 
well as the target woman, to know they are looking at her in order to display 
their power over her and turn her into a sexual object.17 Some believe it is a 
                                                                                                             
ment to seek out victims who will be submissive to them, a practice known as “rape testing.” 
Id. at 536. 
10  Bowman, supra note 3, at 537–38; Heben, supra note 2, at 201–02; Marc Tran, Note, 
Combatting Gender Privilege and Recognizing a Woman’s Right to Privacy in Public Spac-
es: Arguments to Criminalize Catcalling and Creepshots, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 185, 
187 (2015). Some have called it “spirit murder,” a series of micro-aggressions, “the cumula-
tive effect of which is the slow death of the psyche, the soul and the persona.” Davis, supra 
note 7, at 176 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
11  Bowman, supra note 3, at 539; Davis, supra note 7, at 144–45; Thompson, supra note 9, 
at 322. Similarly, women may also bring a male escort to lessen their fears of crime. Carol 
Brooks Gardner, Safe Conduct: Women, Crime, and Self in Public Places, 37 SOC. PROBS. 
311, 319 (1990). 
12  Cornell International Survey on Street Harassment, HOLLABACK (2016), 
http://www.ihollaback.org/cornell-international-survey-on-street-harassment/ [https://perm 
a.cc/SWT7-A6XN] (last visited Apr. 23, 2017). 
13  Davis, supra note 7, at 164–68. 
14  Bowman, supra note 3, at 542–43; Beth A. Quinn, Sexual Harassment and Masculinity: 
The Power and Meaning of “Girl Watching”, 16 GENDER & SEXUALITY 386, 392 (2002). 
15  Olatokunbo Olukemi Laniya, Street Smut: Gender, Media, and the Legal Power Dynam-
ics of Street Harassment, or “Hey Sexy” and Other Verbal Ejaculations, 14 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 91, 108–09 (2005). 
16  Bowman, supra note 3, at 541; see also Davis, supra note 7, at 140 (describing street har-
assment as “sexual terrorism” that maintains social orders). 
17  Quinn, supra note 14, at 392. 
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way for men to inform women that they are being sexualized,18 in an effort to 
dominate, intimidate, or exclude women from the public sphere.19 
In contrast to street harassment, cyber-harassment is usually more explicit-
ly insulting and threatening. Cyber-harassment is the term used when someone 
is sent tweets, messages, or comments that are demeaning or offensive in an 
effort to cause the recipient emotional distress.20 As with street harassment, alt-
hough there is nothing inherently gender-restrictive about cyber-harassment, 
the victims are typically women, gay men, or transgender women, and the per-
petrators are usually men.21 Due to these trends, this article will focus on wom-
en as victims and men as perpetrators, though the arguments advanced herein 
apply with equal force to all genders. 
The most common areas for women to be subjected to cyber-harassment 
are on dating websites or apps after they ignore or politely reject a man’s ad-
vances, or in response to something a woman posted online, either through 
twitter, a blog, or a website. Several websites have been created to allow wom-
en who have been harassed on dating sites or social media to post screenshots 
of the abuse, often with the identifying information of the harasser left intact.22 
These websites show that, in response to perceived rejection, men often insult 
and sometimes threaten the woman they had previously made romantic over-
tures to.23 Women are not only called names and insulted (usually called over-
weight or unattractive) but they can also be intimidated and threatened with 
bodily harm.24 Women of color, unexpectedly, are more likely to be harassed.25 
                                                
18  Shannon Deep, ‘Hello’ Isn’t Always ‘Hello’ in NYC, HUFFINGTON POST (updated Jan. 6, 
2015) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shannon-deep-/new_3_b_6103200.html [https://perm 
a.cc/U7DX-3GDA]. 
19  See About: What is Street Harassment?, HOLLABACK, https://peterborough.ihollaback.org/ 
about/ [https://perma.cc/HL6E-C9VG] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (“The real motive of 
street harassment is intimidation. To make its target scared or uncomfortable, and to make 
the harasser feel powerful.”). 
20  Jameson, supra note 2, at 235. 
21  Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 378 (2009); Ari Ezra Waldman, Amplifying Abuse: The Fusion of 
Cyberharassment and Discrimination, B.U. L. Rev. Annex (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.b 
u.edu/bulawreview/waldman-amplifying-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/Z2WF-2N8M]. 
22  See, e.g., Bye Felipe (@byefelipe), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/byefeli 
pe/?hl=en [https://perma.cc/658C-T7XZ] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017); STRAIGHT WHITE 
BOYS TEXTING, http://straightwhiteboystexting.org/important [https://perma.cc/KL79-FN83] 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2017). Fortunately, these sites also cover up the offending images that 
are often posted as examples of harassment. 
23  Bye Felipe, supra note 22; STRAIGHT WHITE BOYS TEXTING, supra note 22. 
24  Tracy L.M. Kennedy, An Exploratory Study of Feminist Experiences in Cyberspace, 3 
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAVIOR 707, 715–16 (2000); Hess, supra note 3. 
25  See Zeba Blay, I Wasn’t Prepared for the Horror Story That Is Online Dating While 
Black, XOJANE (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.xojane.com/sex/online-dating-as-a-black-woman 
[https://perma.cc/C76L-WNQY]; Charlie Brinkhurst-Cuff, Women of Color Get No Love on 
Tinder, VICE (May 14, 2015), http://www.vice.com/en_us/article/this-is-what-its-like-to-be-
a-woman-of-color-on-tinder-514 [https://perma.cc/Z2TN-44PR]. 
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In addition, women who write online, either as tweeters, bloggers, or jour-
nalists—particularly those who write on traditionally masculine subjects such 
as science, video games, or comic books—are often targeted by cyber-
harassers.26 So too are women who write with a feminist lens or criticize others 
for misogyny.27 As one reporter described it, women (and gay men) who write 
on the internet are subjected to an entirely different level of “intensely personal 
missives of hyper-sexualized hate.”28 The abuse can also be taken on as a cause 
by a larger group of men who, in a concerted effort, do whatever they can to 
make the victim’s life miserable.29 
As a result of cyber-harassment, victims feel fear and intimidation; many 
withdraw from the internet altogether.30 Cyber-harassment also affects their ca-
reers—female journalists may stop blogging or refuse to take on certain topics 
that are certain to open them up to misogynist invective.31 Even the effort it 
takes to filter, document, and seek out law enforcement involves mental, emo-
tional, and financial costs for women that men simply do not experience.32 
Moreover, the threats can be so personal and specific that women are forced to 
leave their homes and be constantly vigilant when in public.33 Most troublingly, 
in these situations, the victim’s personal information can be made public so the 
harassment can continue offline.34 
Clearly, street and cyber-harassment constitute a serious problem for their 
victims, one that is so harmful and commonplace that it seems appropriate for 
the law to step in. However, invoking the law is likely to be met with substan-
tial resistance, particularly under the First Amendment. Indeed, past efforts to 
                                                
26  Jenn Frank, How to Attack a Woman Who Works in Video Gaming, GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 
2014, 9:44 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep/01/how-to-attack-a-
woman-who-works-in-video-games [https://perma.cc/TJE7-NSMB]; Rachael Krishna, This 
Woman Writer Was Trolled so Badly, She Left Twitter, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Oct. 27, 2016, 8:57 
AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/krishrach/a-women-writer-was-harassed-off-twitter-for-a-
feminist-comic?utm_term=.urzANVR2e#.kenDv7Ppm [https://perma.cc/AL7T-QG3R]. 
27  Lindy West, What Happened When I Confronted My Cruelest Troll, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 
2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/feb/02/what-happened-confront 
ed-cruellest-troll-lindy-west [https://perma.cc/WJ3G-XYKH]; see also Richard Spillett, 
‘You're Pretty but You Have Crazy Written All in Your Eyes’: Student, 19, Who Changed 
Her Tinder Profile to Include the Word ‘Feminist’ is Immediately Trolled by Other Users, 
DAILY MAIL (July 8, 2016, 2:47 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3681096/Stu 
dent-trolled-desecribing-feminist-Tinder.html [https://perma.cc/C7J7-YQAJ]. 
28  Conor Friedersdorf, When Misogynist Trolls Make Journalism Miserable for Women, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/when-misog 
ynist-trolls-make-journalism-miserable-for-women/282862/ [https://perma.cc/5DY2-LXC9]. 
29  Tara Dublin, I Got Doxxed After Giving a Donald Trump Supporter the Finger, XOJANE 
(Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.xojane.com/issues/trump-supporters-doxxing-me-for-giving-fin 
ger [https://perma.cc/A4GC-UD3X]. 
30  Citron, supra note 21, at 386; Hess, supra note 3. 
31  Friedersdorf, supra note 28. 
32  Id. 
33  Hess, supra note 3. 
34  Dublin, supra note 29. 
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restrict hate speech against other groups have been largely struck down on First 
Amendment freedom of expression grounds.35 Accordingly, in order to effec-
tively regulate street and cyber-harassment, legislators will need to find a way 
to ensure that the law satisfies the requirements of the First Amendment. 
II.   THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SILENCING PUBLIC SPEECH 
One reason street and cyber-harassment will be difficult to regulate under 
the First Amendment is that those acts take place in public. The Supreme Court 
has recently reaffirmed that “[c]onsistent with the traditionally open character 
of public streets and sidewalks, we have held that the government’s ability to 
restrict speech in such locations is ‘very limited.’ ”36 More specifically, the Su-
preme Court has previously noted that public sidewalks are assumed to be pub-
lic free speech forums with heightened First Amendment protection.37 Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, “the guiding First Amendment principle that the 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ide-
as, its subject matter, or its content applies with full force in a traditional public 
forum.”38 
The offensive nature of speech is also of no import under the First 
Amendment. According to the Supreme Court, “when the government, acting 
as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech 
on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the First Amendment 
strictly limits its power.”39 Further,  
[i]n most circumstances, the Constitution does not permit the government to de-
cide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to re-
quire protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, . . . the burden nor-
mally falls upon the viewer to avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities 
simply by averting [his] eyes.40  
Consequently, when “pitting the First Amendment rights of speakers against 
the privacy rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or auditors” the 
courts must engage in “delicate balancing” of those interests.41 
                                                
35  See, e.g., UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 
1165–69, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 856–57, 867–69 
(E.D. Mich. 1989). 
36  McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (internal citation omitted). 
37  United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). 
38  Coakley, 134 S. Ct. at 2529 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
39  Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975). 
40  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). 
41  Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000) (quoting Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209); see also 
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302–03 (1974) (“Although American con-
stitutional jurisprudence, in the light of the First Amendment, has been jealous to preserve 
access to public places for purposes of free speech, the nature of the forum and the conflict-
ing interests involved have remained important in determining the degree of protection af-
forded by the Amendment to the speech in question.”). 
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 With regard to sex-based harassment or intimidation, any law that limits 
such speech is arguably creating a content-based prohibition on speech, to 
which courts give the highest level of scrutiny.42 Content-based prohibitions on 
speech restrict speech based on what the person is saying, limiting some sub-
jects and not others.43 An argument could be made that laws against street and 
cyber-harassment really restrict behavior or secondary effects of speech. This is 
because the restrictions on street and cyber-harassment would likely focus on 
the effects of the speech by prohibiting speech that harms or harasses the lis-
tener, instead of focusing on what the speaker is saying. The Supreme Court is 
generally willing to allow restrictions on speech if the government is trying to 
prevent secondary effects and not the speech itself.44 For example, in City of 
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., the Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordi-
nance restricting the location of adult theaters because the city was trying to 
combat the increased crime and other “urban blight” effects that were associat-
ed with those theaters.45 
However, the Supreme Court has held that restricting speech based on its 
emotional impact still counts as a content-based restriction on speech.46 Being 
offended by speech, in other words, is too closely tied to the speech itself to be 
considered a secondary effect. Consequently, laws targeting street and cyber-
harassment are likely to be seen as content-based restrictions on speech. 
Furthermore, unless the speech has a physical act component (such as cross 
burning),47 the Supreme Court has generally been opposed to laws that restrict 
hateful or offensive speech, particularly when the speaker is using that speech 
to also talk about issues of public interest.48 Lower courts have likewise struck 
down speech codes meant to curb offensive speech, even those limited to uni-
versity campuses, on the grounds that those codes are vague and overbroad.49 
Moreover, because these laws are content-based, they cannot be considered 
                                                
42  R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, Inter-
mediate Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 292 (2016). Public 
speech regulations that are content neutral, in contrast, are given intermediate scrutiny, 
which requires that the regulations be “‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for communication of information.’ ” 
Id. at 293 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
43  Snyder, 562 U.S. at 457 (noting that an ordinance was not content-neutral because liability 
attached because of what the protesters said, not the fact that they were protesting); Ward, 
491 U.S. at 791 (1989) (“[T]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is 
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with 
the message it conveys.”). 
44  City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1986). 
45  Id. at 51. 
46  Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). 
47  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347–48 (2003). 
48  Snyder, 562 U.S. at 444–45. 
49  UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1165–67, 
1181 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 856–57, 867–69 (E.D. 
Mich. 1989). 
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“time, place, or manner” restrictions, that are typically given intermediate scru-
tiny.50 Accordingly, any restrictions on such speech will receive strict scruti-
ny.51 
Scholars have begun to grapple with this problem and have suggested a va-
riety of ways to regulate street or cyber-harassment without running afoul of 
the First Amendment. For example, some have argued that sexual harassment 
or street harassment should not be given First Amendment protection because it 
constitutes “fighting words,” that has traditionally not been protected.52 
Fighting words is a narrow concept and applies to words “which by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”53 
These words must also be “personally abusive epithets” that are “addressed to 
the ordinary citizen.”54 
However, although there is an argument to be made that street and cyber-
harassment can constitute fighting words, much of the doctrine would need to 
be adapted to apply to these modern problems. First, not all street harassment 
comes in the form of personally abusive epithets. Instead, much of street har-
assment is cloaked in benign “compliments”; it is the intrusion, and not the 
words themselves, that is offensive. Similarly, although cyber-harassment does 
take the form of personal insults more often, the concept of “fighting words” 
does not appear to apply to cyber-harassment because the encounters do not 
happen face-to-face where a violent reaction is possible. Finally, this doctrine 
may not be applicable to street or cyber-harassment because women are social-
ized to not fight back when provoked.55 Because women respond with fear and 
are unlikely to be violent in response, which is what the “fighting words” doc-
                                                
50  Patrick M. Garry, The First Amendment and Non-Political Speech: Exploring a Constitu-
tional Model That Focuses on the Existence of Alternative Channels of Communication, 72 
MO. L. REV. 477, 485 (2007) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989)); Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1826 (1992). 
51  United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). 
52  Bowman, supra note 3, at 558; Bunkosal Chhun, Note, Catcalls: Protected Speech or 
Fighting Words?, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 273, 273–74 (2011); Maeve Olney, Note, Toward 
a Socially Responsible Application of the Criminal Law to the Problem of Street Harass-
ment, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 129, 148–50 (2015). 
53  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see also Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (stating fighting words are those words that, “as a matter of common 
knowledge,” are “inherently likely to provoke violent reaction”). 
54  Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20. 
55  Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 17–19 
(1990); see also Sopen B. Shah, Open Season: Street Harassment as True Threats, 18 U. PA. 
J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 377, 391 (2016); Chhun, supra note 52, at 290–91; Gabrielle Moss, Do 
You Respond to Catcalling? 23 Women Reveal How They Reply to Street Harassment, 
BUSTLE (July 14, 2015), http://www.bustle.com/articles/97065-do-you-respond-to-catcall 
ing-23-women-reveal-how-they-reply-to-street-harassment [https://perma.cc/HR3W-7DAX] 
(stating that many of the women surveyed said they did not respond to street harassment or 
responded less assertively than they wished they had). 
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trine seeks to avoid, it is unlikely that a court would find this doctrine to be ap-
plicable to either street or cyber-harassment. 
Similarly, obscenity is an unlikely avenue for evading First Amendment 
protection because most of the comments levelled at women either in public or 
online do not meet the strict standards of the Miller test.56 The Miller test re-
quires that, in order to be legally “obscene,” material must “appeal to the pruri-
ent interest in sex in a patently offensive manner and lack serious redeeming 
‘literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.’ ”57 Most street and cyber-
harassment, though based on gender, is more about intimidation than appealing 
to a prurient interest in sex.58 Even threats of rape are not meant to provoke 
feelings of lust in their targets; they are meant to frighten or upset them. 
Further, some have argued that street harassment should be considered 
“low value” speech because it is not relevant to public affairs, it is noncogni-
tive, the speaker is not trying to send a message or impart some knowledge, and 
the government has a legitimate reason to regulate the speech.59 The two cate-
gories of low value speech identified by the Supreme Court are commercial 
speech60 and sexually explicit speech.61 Sexually explicit speech appears to 
closely resemble some aspects of street or cyber-harassment, but not all of it. 
Like obscenity, “sexually explicit speech” requires much more sexual content 
than the full spectrum of street and cyber-harassment; the speech must be of a 
sexual nature62 and street and cyber-harassment can run the gamut from seem-
ingly innocuous greetings to death threats, neither of which has overt sexual 
content. Moreover, courts have rarely used this doctrine for sexually explicit 
speech, usually invoking it for nude dancing and combining it with the speech’s 
secondary effects as well as the time, place, or manner restrictions discussed 
above.63 
Another argument, and one that has not been fully addressed in the litera-
ture,64 is that street and cyber-harassment should be limited under the First 
Amendment using the “captive audience doctrine.” 
                                                
56  See Strauss, supra note 55, at 19–20 (arguing that sexual harassment is unlikely to be le-
gally obscene, particularly because the speech is about power, not sex). 
57  Jessica R. Vartanian, Speaking of Workplace Harassment: A First Amendment Push To-
ward a Status-Blind Statute Regulating “Workplace Bullying”, 65 ME. L. REV. 175, 193 
(2012) (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). 
58  Bowman, supra note 3, at 541. 
59  Olney, supra note 52, at 148. 
60  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 
n.24 (1976). 
61  Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). 
62  “Sexually explicit speech” has not been fully defined by the courts but appears to refer to 
speech with an overt erotic or sexual content, such as pornography. See id. at 69–70. 
63  Vartanian, supra note 57, at 195; Arnold H. Loewy, The Use, Nonuse, and Misuse of Low 
Value Speech, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 195, 199 n.27 (2001). 
64  This concept has been thoroughly explored with regard to workplace sexual harassment. 
See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 55, at 36–37; Volokh, supra note 50, at 1840–42. 
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III.   THE CAPTIVE AUDIENCE DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court has recognized that speech may be limited, even in 
public, where “the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling 
viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.”65 Accordingly, “the ability of govern-
ment, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect 
others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy 
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”66 
Whether speech invades privacy interests often rests on the difficulty of 
avoiding it. To that end, the Supreme Court has repeatedly made a distinction 
between speech encountered inside and outside the home: 
Although in many locations, we expect individuals simply to avoid speech they 
do not want to hear, the home is different. That we are often “captives” outside 
the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech . . . does not mean 
we must be captives everywhere. Instead, a special benefit of the privacy all citi-
zens enjoy within their own walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an 
ability to avoid intrusions. Thus, we have repeatedly held that individuals are not 
required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that the gov-
ernment may protect this freedom.67 
Accordingly, the State can restrict even the mailing of unwanted material to a 
person’s home.68 
In contrast, according to Justice Scalia, “Outside the home, the burden is 
generally on the observer or listener to avert his eyes or plug his ears against 
the verbal assaults, lurid advertisements, tawdry books and magazines, and oth-
er ‘offensive’ intrusions which increasingly attend urban life.”69 Indeed, ac-
cording to the Ninth Circuit, “captive” must mean more than simply being “less 
interested in staying where they are rather than moving to a different loca-
tion.”70 Therefore, pursuing activities in public such as “waiting in line, attend-
                                                
65  Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000) (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 
422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)). 
66  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459–60 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). For example, members of the Westboro Baptist Church who were protesting out-
side of a funeral were given First Amendment protection because the members “stayed well 
away from the memorial service,” the family “could see no more than the tops of the signs 
when driving to the funeral” and there was “no indication that the picketing in any way inter-
fered with the funeral service itself.” Id. at 460. 
67  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484–85 (1988) (citations omitted); see also Erznoznik, 
422 U.S. at 209 (noting that content restrictions have been upheld “when the speaker in-
trudes on the privacy of the home”). 
68  Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (“The asserted right of a 
mailer, we repeat, stops at the outer boundary of every person’s domain.”). 
69  Hill, 530 U.S. at 752–53 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); see also Eugene Volokh, Gruesome Speech, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 936 (2015) 
(extolling the virtues of having an open marketplace of ideas on the public streets, even if 
offensive speech is unavoidable there). 
70  Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1055 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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ing an event, or eating without communication by others” does not implicate a 
substantial privacy interest.71 
However, the captive audience doctrine does not require that the listener or 
viewer be actually trapped or captive. Instead, the question is whether the per-
son should have to flee to avoid the speech.72 Some speech, scholars have ar-
gued, creates a coercive environment that the victim should not be forced to 
flee because doing so requires the victim to make an unfair choice.73 For exam-
ple, a worker should not have to choose between being repeatedly subjected to 
sexually harassing speech and keeping her job; that is precisely why Title VII 
forbids the creation of a hostile work environment.74 In other words, it is the 
situation, not the physical place, that should determine whether the audience is 
captive.75 Some Supreme Court jurisprudence can be read to follow this line of 
thought. 
In some public places, when the speech is difficult to avoid and the audi-
ence is there “as a matter of necessity, not of choice,” the Supreme Court is 
more likely to apply the captive audience doctrine.76 Consequently, speech on 
public transportation has been limited under the captive audience doctrine.77 
Similarly, speech at a graduation ceremony78 or in a college classroom79 has 
been held to impact a captive audience. In contrast, public spaces such as parks 
or street corners are inherently open and unlikely to hold a captive audience.80 
The medium of the message is also important. The Supreme Court has 
shown much less tolerance for restrictions on printed messages than verbal 
ones.81 According to Justice Stevens, even if someone can publicly protest by 
“placing a vulgar message on his jacket and, in so doing, expose unwilling 
viewers, . . . that does not mean that he has an unqualified constitutional right 
to follow and harass an unwilling listener.”82 For that reason, broadcast media 
                                                
71  Id. 
72  J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2310–11 
(1999). 
73  Id. at 2312. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. at 2312–13. 
76  Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974). 
77  Id. In public transportation situations, the Court also noted that the State uses it as a 
source of commerce, which gives the State an interest in ensuring that its passengers are not 
offended. Id. at 303. 
78  Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009). 
79  Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1986). 
80  Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302; see also Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1054–55 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (stating public park visitors were not a captive audience). 
81  FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749–50 (1978); see also Madsen v. Women’s 
Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772–73 (1994) (“The First Amendment does not demand that 
patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political 
protests.”). 
82  Madsen, 512 U.S. at 781 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21–22 (1971)). 
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has been given a lower level of scrutiny than print media.83 In contrast, lower 
federal courts have recently refused to apply the captive audience doctrine to an 
offensive beer label displayed in grocery stores84 or to offensive personalized 
license plates85 because the viewer could easily avert their eyes. 
Where the street and cyber-harassment fit on this spectrum is difficult to 
predict. Street harassment typically takes place on a public street, making it less 
likely than some venues to create a captive audience. However, the messages 
are usually verbal, which are more difficult to avoid. In contrast, the Supreme 
Court has previously distinguished the internet from broadcast media, empha-
sizing that, unlike with television, it is difficult for users to stumble upon offen-
sive content.86 This holding, as well as the Court’s assumption that it is difficult 
for children to maneuver to inappropriate sites online, has been criticized by 
scholars.87 Moreover, the Supreme Court has more recently acknowledged that 
it is easier for minors to acquire pornography on the internet than was first im-
agined.88 In addition, because of technology, users can access the internet any-
where, including in public and their homes, effectively bridging the pub-
lic/home divide and making that traditional distinction unworkable.89 
Another way to look at captive audience precedent is how direct or targeted 
the message is. Messages that are intended only for specific individuals are 
more likely to invade privacy than messages that are intended for the general 
public.90 Instead of spreading ideas to the public, targeted messages are directed 
at a particular person and are intent on reaching that person whether she wants 
to hear the message or not.91 These targeted messages are therefore more likely 
to continue to intrude until the target has heard the message, making avoidance 
extremely difficult.92 As noted by the Supreme Court, listeners have “a right to 
                                                
83  Patrick M. Garry, The First Amendment in a Time of Media Proliferation: Does Freedom 
of Speech Entail a Private Right to Censor?, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 183, 192–93 (2004). 
84  Flying Dog Brewery, LLP v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm’n, 597 F. App’x 342, 374–
75 (6th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (“[T]he captive audience doctrine does not aid the Commis-
sioners because seeing a beer bottle label in a grocery store or a restaurant does not invade 
substantial privacy interests . . . in an essentially intolerable manner.”) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
85  Matwyuk v. Johnson, 22 F. Supp. 3d 812, 829–30 (W.D. Mich. 2014). 
86  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868–70 (1997). 
87  Garry, supra note 83, at 202. 
88  United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 200 (2003) (“The accessibility of 
this material has created serious problems for libraries, which have found that patrons of all 
ages, including minors, regularly search for online pornography.”). 
89  Patrick M. Garry, The Flip Side of the First Amendment: A Right to Filter, 2004 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 57, 73 (2004). 
90  John B. Major, Note, Cyberstalking, Twitter, and the Captive Audience: A First Amend-
ment Analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 149 (2012). 
91  See Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment 
Laws, and “Cyberstalking”, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 740–43 (2013). 
92  Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. 
L. Rev. 939, 945–46 (2009). 
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be free from persistent importunity, following and dogging after an offer to 
communicate has been declined.”93 
Moreover, the nature of the message itself may be considered when deter-
mining whether someone’s privacy interests have been invaded in an intolera-
ble manner. Substantial privacy interests may be burdened by speech if the na-
ture of the speech is “offensive and disturbing,”94 or affects the psychological 
or physical well-being of the targeted listeners, particularly if they are seeking 
medical attention.95 For that reason, the Supreme Court upheld an injunction 
provision that required abortion protestors to move away from abortion clinic 
patients who asked to be left alone.96 Other relevant state interests include “en-
suring the public safety and order . . . [and] promoting the free flow of traffic 
on public streets and sidewalks.”97 
According to constitutional law scholar Marcy Strauss, although the cap-
tive audience doctrine has been applied inconsistently by the courts, it generally 
protects the privacy rights of listeners in three different ways: (1) the right to 
make our own choices without interference; (2) “the right to repose” or find 
peace without intrusion; and (3) “the right to be free from offensive speech” as 
long as there is a definite harm associated with that speech.98 
Strauss has also suggested a three-part test for when to apply the captive 
audience doctrine: (1) the justification for applying the doctrine (using the three 
justifications listed above); (2) the potential “burden on the listener in avoiding 
the speech”; and (3) the impact on expression, particularly on willing listen-
ers.99 Under this test, if the speech is highly intrusive, poses a large burden to 
avoid it, and has a minimal effect on expression, the captive audience doctrine 
should be used.100 These criteria may be used to show that even the public 
street or internet can create a captive audience when harassment is so common-
place. 
 
                                                
93  Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
94  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (explaining that anti-abortionists were picket-
ing outside a doctor’s house). 
95  Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (explaining that anti-
abortionists were picketing and counselling outside an abortion clinic). 
96  Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 383–84 (1997). 
97  Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768. 
98  Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85, 
108–16 (1991). 
99  Id. at 116–20. 
100  Id. at 120. Strauss has also argued that workplace harassment should be subject to a cap-
tive audience analysis and a few federal courts have adopted this approach when applying 
Title VII. See Strauss, supra note 55, at 36; see also Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaum, Hostile 
Environment Sexual Harassment Law and the First Amendment: Can the Two Peacefully 
Coexist? 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 67, 89 n.138 (2002) (citing cases). 
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A.   Justification for Regulating Street and Cyber-Harassment 
Using Strauss’s test, the State has ample reasons for regulating street and 
cyber-harassment:  
lessening the danger of violence, . . . preventing the psychological injury that is 
inflicted on the target of such language, . . . addressing the general social offense 
or outrage that such language is used, and . . . the destructive attitude of male 
superiority and social acceptance of violence against women.101  
Suppressing sexist speech may also lessen discriminatory behavior by changing 
attitudes.102 By passing a law that restricts or criminalizes street and cyber-
harassment, society will send a message such behavior is harmful and not to be 
tolerated. Similarly, by suppressing sexist, harassing speech, women will feel 
safer to engage in public activities and use their own voices online, ultimately 
increasing the speech available to others. In addition, street harassment is 
sometimes a precursor to physical violence.103 By criminalizing street harass-
ment, women will have a way to prevent physical abuse. 
Moreover, all three of Strauss’s offered justifications for regulating speech 
are present here. Street and cyber-harassment affect women’s choices of where 
to go and when, and what they can say or do online. It disturbs their peace 
when in public and subjects them to offensive speech that causes psychological 
and physical harm. Accordingly, much would be accomplished by regulating 
street and cyber-harassment. 
B.   The Burden on the Listeners 
 Street and cyber-harassment also place a heavy burden on the listeners. 
Women cannot simply avoid street harassment when it is everywhere, when 
harassers may follow them, and when the costs of ignoring harassment may 
cause it to escalate into violence. As noted above, women already change their 
travel routes, modes of transportation and even frequency of travel to avoid 
street harassment. It is not a stretch to argue that women suffer a substantial 
burden to avoid this unwanted speech. 
 Similarly, the internet may create a captive audience because there is no al-
ternative for those who use the internet for their social lives or livelihood.104 
There is no other place like the internet for the rapid exchange of ideas and 
pure reach to other people around the world. Although one scholar has argued 
                                                
101  Olney, supra note 52, at 146. 
102  Strauss, supra note 55, at 14–15. 
103  Indeed, there is a Tumblr page that collects news stories and first-person testimonials of 
when men have reacted with violence to a woman’s rejection. See WHEN WOMEN REFUSE, 
http://whenwomenrefuse.tumblr.com/ [https://perma.cc/62FQ-99ZH] (last visited Apr. 18, 
2017). 
104  See Patrick M. Garry, A New First Amendment Model for Evaluating Content-Based 
Regulation of Internet Pornography: Revising the Strict Scrutiny Model to Better Reflect the 
Realities of the Modern Media Age, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1595, 1613–14 (2007). 
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that “an individual confronted with an uncomfortable message can always . . . 
leave the Web site,”105 the importance of the internet socially and professional-
ly for many people makes that much less of an option than it used to be.106 
 Moreover, some web services such as Twitter make it almost impossible 
for the victim to tune out the harassing messages. Twitter allows users to “tag” 
their intended recipient, which places the harassing message alongside other 
messages that the victim wants to read so that the victim will invariably read 
the harassing message before she realizes it is harassment.107 Even blocking the 
offending user will do little because the user can simply make another account 
or combine his efforts with others to send a deluge of harassment.108 That is ex-
actly what happened with actress Leslie Jones; the initial instigator did not send 
any harassing messages himself.109 Instead, he sounded a call to action among 
his followers who were happy to send hundreds of offensive, racist messages to 
her. Twitter has since begun deleting accounts of users who have been reported 
for hate speech110 but those efforts are piecemeal and usually after the fact. 
Similarly, online dating apps or websites have messaging functions where 
other users can send each other messages without invitation or any other kind 
of screening.111 Such a process is meant to help people connect more easily but 
it also makes it easier for men to harass multiple women at once. To avoid all 
harassing messages, women would have to leave the site or app entirely, defeat-
ing the purpose of online dating. Accordingly, due to the way internet messag-
ing works, it is extremely difficult to avoid harassing speech without also 
avoiding all speech.112 
                                                
105  Volokh, supra note 69, at 936. 
106  Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 
1113 (2011). 
107  Major, supra note 90, at 125. 
108  Id. at 150. 
109  Kristen V. Brown, How a Racist, Sexist Hate Mob Forced Leslie Jones off Twitter, 
FUSION (July 19, 2016, 12:52 PM), http://fusion.net/story/327103/leslie-jones-twitter-racism/ 
[https://perma.cc/86U7-CTSM]. 
110  Laura Bult, Twitter Bans Multiple Accounts of Prominent Alt-Right Leaders Citing Viola-
tion of Hate Speech Rules, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016, 4:03 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/twitter-bans-multiple-alt-right-leaders-accounts-
hate-speech-article-1.2876266; Ivana Kottasova, Facebook and Twitter Pledge to Remove 
Hate Speech Within 24 Hours, CNN (May 31, 2016, 8:35 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/ 
05/31/technology/hate-speech-facebook-twitter-eu/ [https://perma.cc/KB78-4LP5]. 
111  Olga Khazan, Rise of the Feminist Tinder-Creep-Busting Web Vigilante, ATLANTIC (Oct. 
27, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/10/rise-of-the-feminist-creep-bust 
ing-web-vigilante/381809/ [https://perma.cc/P983-PJTG]. 
112  One scholar has argued for filtering as a “self-help” technique that would remove the 
availability of the captive audience doctrine. Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and 
Self-Help: How Technology Upgrades Constitutional Jurisprudence, 87 MINN. L. REV. 743, 
763–65 (2003). However, as argued above, filtering presents an after-the-fact, partial solu-
tion, at best. 
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Consequently, for both street and cyber-harassment, it is difficult for wom-
en to avoid this unwanted speech without fundamentally altering the way they 
interact with the world. A high burden, to be sure. 
C.   Impact on Willing Listeners 
 Finally, prohibiting street and cyber-harassment would have a low impact 
on expression. Although a few women have asserted that they like street har-
assment,113 the vast majority of women find it intimidating and upsetting.114 In 
other words, there are few willing listeners to street harassment and it is hard to 
imagine that anyone would miss it. Cyber-harassment has even fewer willing 
recipients because the speech is overwhelmingly violent and insulting. Alt-
hough some bystanders may enjoy watching others being humiliated and at-
tacked online, this is hardly the kind of expression the First Amendment was 
meant to protect. Therefore, despite what one scholar has argued,115 harassment 
is not productive speech. It does not seek to inform others or create a dialogue; 
it only seeks to intimidate and upset. Restrictions on street and cyber-
harassment would not deprive anyone of meaningful ideas or discussion. 
Accordingly, based on Strauss’s three-part test, street and cyber-
harassment are good candidates for the captive audience doctrine. These forms 
of harassment have multiple harmful effects, create a burden on the unwilling 
recipients, and provide little to no value for any willing listeners. 
CONCLUSION 
Both street and cyber-harassment carry significant harms for their victims, 
resulting in women often leaving or reducing their exposure to the public 
sphere out of fear. Although there are many obstacles to regulating street and 
cyber-harassment, the First Amendment should not be one of them. The street 
and the internet are large, public places, but harassment in these venues is so 
commonplace and pronounced that women feel trapped there. The right to 
speak, to say harassing, hateful things, should not outweigh a woman’s right to 
some privacy and peace when she enters the public sphere. By using the captive 
audience doctrine, courts can uphold regulations against speech that are meant 
to harass and intimidate women as they go about their daily lives, meet new 
people, and do their jobs. Accordingly, the captive audience doctrine represents 
a good way forward when balancing the rights of men to speak their minds and 
the rights of women to be left alone. 
                                                
113  See, e.g., Lewak, supra note 8. 
114  Bowman, supra note 3, at 537–38. 
115  See Volokh, supra note 50, at 1841–42 (arguing that workplace harassment constitutes 
“political speech”). 
